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Fighting With One Arm Behind Our Back:
Cultural Capability in the 21st Century
We need to stop beating ourselves up about being too much of a COINforce and not turn our backs on the lessons of the last ten years. War is a very human dimension and will remain so in the complex 21 st century security environment. 1 Wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions-all these tasks demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation. 2 The U.S. Army has pursued two major counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq for the last decade. As it withdraws from combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it will transition to a Decisive Action force focused on the full range of conflict against hybrid adversaries in a fiscally constrained environment. An integral part of this transition is determining which lessons from the last 10 years of conflict remain valid. One thing remains clear. The 21st century environment will be marked by uncertainty and volatility, meaning the suite of potential conflict areas requiring the employment of U.S. land power will include nearly every region of the world-each having its own array of cultures. The manner in which the army educates, trains and organizes its Soldiers for operations in and amongst diverse cultures will substantially contribute to the success or failure of landpower employment in pursuit of national security interests. Hence, the lessons learned (and those not learned) operating in a culturally capable manner in support of combat and counterinsurgency operations in the last ten years hold particular value for the future.
Chairman Dempsey has tasked every professional to "develop and adopt lessons learned from the past decade of war [and] promote a culture of continuous learning and 2 adaptation at every echelon of the Joint Force." 3 An organizational and historical study of the Army's efforts to build a culturally capable force reveals an ambiguous record at best. Although the Army has invested significant effort, resources and attention to first, cultural awareness and most recently, cultural capability, it has only achieved marginal success across the force as a whole. A study of its organizational, education and training approach reveals uneven application and understanding of the principles of cultural capability and its employment at the tactical level. However, the successes and failures of the last ten years yield valuable insights that offer potential alternatives to organizing, educating and training the force for its 21 st century mission. This paper surveys the broad swath of Army approaches to the challenge of building cultural capability among Soldiers at the tactical level and makes recommendations in each of these areas to better posture the 21st century force for its cultural responsibilities across the globe.
One doesn't have to look hard or long to discover the strategic importance of a culturally capable force in the 21 st century. Whether heroic, good, informed, ill-judged, ignorant or criminal, U.S. Soldiers' behavior and actions have a significant and farreaching impact on the United States' ability to accomplish highly complex and difficult missions in, and amongst, foreign cultures. A myriad of stakeholders observe, weigh, and judge American Soldiers' actions and behaviors. Their perceptions have a distinct, but important, role in successful conflict resolution. Key stakeholders include the security forces and host-nation government the U.S. partners with, who are responsible for ensuring lasting security and stability, and the enemy that U.S. forces contend against, who oftentimes play a political role in conflict termination. Perhaps the most important stakeholders, in today's information era, are the indigenous population, the international community, and the American people. It is their perceptions, which are influenced by culture, of U.S. troops' actions that affect and sustain the will for military operations.
Countless U.S. Army Soldiers and leaders fully grasp the importance of operating in a culturally aware manner. The cause of many attacks is unknown, since in most cases the attacker is killed during the incident and it is difficult to determine an exact motive. However, some portion of these unknown attacks are also likely due to personal grievances. If one breaks down the 30 unknown attacks using the same proportions as the known attacks, the potential percentage of attacks due to personal grievances rises from 38% to nearly 50%.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) understands the strategic import of the rise in insider attacks. General John Allen acknowledged the significance of the trend stating, "We are willing to sacrifice a lot for this campaign, but we are not willing to be murdered for it." 9 To reduce the risk of these insider attacks, ISAF has taken significant measures to increase the force protection of U. relationships, family concerns and combat). 16 Combined, these cultural challenges and operational conditions put a premium on effective, emotionally attuned leadership, cultural awareness and conflict resolution skills at the small-unit level. 17 The burden of dealing with these stressors rests on both U.S. and host-nation partner leadership.
However, the U.S. military's focus and responsibility for U.S. interests and force protection demands forces optimized and prepared to operate in this environment.
This is not a challenge that will go away just because we've concluded Because of this complex and interdependent security environment, the United
States will place a premium on security cooperation activities that include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, security force assistance and all efforts that build partners' security capacity. 20 In a 21 st century environment, where nation-states and organized armies no longer monopolize coercive force, our potential partners will include "foreign militaries or police; local tribal leaders; or people whose long-term ideological agendas differ from ours, but whose near-term interests provide opportunities for pragmatic partnering." 21 Effectiveness in achieving our strategic objectives within this complex, multi-cultural and partnered environment requires an ever more culturally astute and expert force. (PME). These experts have incorporated culture and foreign language instruction into existing PME courses at all levels that complements and reinforces previous cultural education efforts from initial entry up to the U.S. Army War College and Sergeant's Major Academy. The Army is also pursuing initiatives designed to enhance USMA and ROTC officers' cultural and foreign language proficiency in both language and cultural immersion programs prior to commissioning. and Mobile Training Teams (MTT); unit-organized and run leader development programs using institutional or educational materials; staff rides and familiarization opportunities with local ethnic communities, and finally, leader reading and professional development programs that study pertinent cultural and regional works.
Despite these institutional and organizational efforts, the challenges that U.S. The Army must change this dynamic by adopting a balanced approach to leader development that better reflects the mutually supporting relationship between regionalspecific and culture-general training. Education and development of leaders in core competencies is a pre-requisite to training Soldiers and units in the tasks associated with those competencies. Therefore, the Army must begin with a cultural shift from solely knowledge based and regional-specific cultural training to incorporating more comprehensive culture-general objectives in its cultural training and education.
Cross-cultural competence is comprised of three components: knowledge, affect and skills. Knowledge is an awareness of one's own and an understanding of others' cultural differences. Affect consists of attitudes towards foreign cultures and the motivation to learn about and engage them. Skills are the ability to regulate one's own reactions in a cross-cultural setting, interpersonal skills and the flexibility to see the perspective of someone from a different culture. 37 Regional-specific training focuses almost exclusively on the knowledge component; however, skills and affect make the greatest contribution to successful outcomes in cross-cultural engagements. 38 In other words, without highly developed skills and affect, the region-specific knowledge is useless since you are left without the capability to effectively utilize the knowledge.
Thus, much current Army cultural training is focused on the least important aspect of the three components of cross-cultural competence and you're left with a force deficient in the areas of skills and affect, as evidenced by Insider Attack studies.
Unlike the Army, the U.S. Marine Corps has embraced a culture-general approach with its concept of operational culture. The Marine Corps defines operational culture as "those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation" within the dimensions of the physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems. 39 This approach identifies cultural differences and similarities in these dimensions and focuses on key societal constructs such as kinship, politics, and religion. While operational culture is built on a solid intellectual basis of anthropological models and is useful in predicting how individuals in one culture will behave relative to those of another culture, "it does not necessarily provide an understanding of the relative importance of various values and norms within that culture…and does not sufficiently prepare personnel to interact with individual members of the culture." 40 So, there are limitations to both methods; the region-specific or knowledge-based approach tends to treat cultures as static and the general-culture model does not account for multiple different competing cultural identities (national, ethnic, religious, tribal) in the same individual or the influence of individual personality on behavior. However, the Marines' operational culture approach does provide the Marine a construct for lifelong learning whereby their "conceptual knowledge can literally 'travel anywhere,' and can be applied to diverse environments." 41 Ultimately, a growing body of professionals sees the combination of these two approaches as the most effective methodology to gain cultural knowledge, awareness and understanding. Cross-cultural competence is built on all three components of knowledge, affect and skills. Army efforts to educate and develop the affect and skills components must focus on reducing ethnocentrism and developing open-minded flexibility, interpersonal and coping skills. Research demonstrates that "interpersonal skills tend to make stronger contributions than even language proficiency or prior international exposure" to cultural competence. 42 As previously determined, the Army's region and knowledge-based method does not provide a balanced approach that results in life-long learning that optimizes cultural competency across diverse environments.
That is why the Army must shift its efforts from predominantly region-specific knowledge to a more balanced approach of regional expertise and general-culture understanding of interpersonal skill sets that are transferable among different settings and cultures. PME provides the most fertile seedbed for implementing efforts to improve cultural capability Army-wide. As an individual passes through sequential gates of learning throughout their career, they would be exposed to incremental, and increasingly more complex and sophisticated, cultural concepts and experiences as a part of their lifelong pursuit of cultural education as a core competency. Subsequently, at each level of responsibility, Army sergeants, staff sergeants, lieutenants and captains would be better prepared to plan, prepare, and execute high-quality training that is culturally relevant. As the profession becomes more culturally adept, its leaders will develop a more nuanced appreciation for culture as both a condition of operating environments and also focus their energies on the critical leader tasks supporting cultural competency. This holistic educational approach has the potential to change an entire generation of leaders in terms of their level of buy-in to cultural competency, motivation to implement its concepts, and creativity in conducting culturally relevant unit training-thus enhancing the Army's ability to operate effectively across the various regions of the globe.
Of course, improvements to unit cultural training are where the Army stands to make the most widespread and impactful gains across the force. Breakdowns in cultural awareness and understanding rarely occur among more senior NonCommissioned and Commissioned Officers; they tend to happen in the much larger population of young, enlisted Soldiers. There are many reasons for this that include:
high daily inter-cultural exposure and contact between these Soldiers and host-nation security forces and the populace; still developing maturity and life-skills; differing socioeconomic backgrounds and ethnocentric world-views; and individuals with fewer premilitary intercultural experiences and less developed cultural coping skills. These
Soldiers are most susceptible to culturally insensitive or damaging behaviors and oftentimes operate in a diffuse and decentralized 21 st century environment beyond the immediate control of their more culturally capable leaders, who benefit from highly developed interpersonal skills based on a career of experience.
However, the Army continues to focus its higher order efforts at building cultural competency on leaders and relies on the less effective, knowledge-based methods such as cultural awareness in training soldiers. The Director of the TCC's observation that current 3C skill development necessary for operational effectiveness will vary across the spectrum of command and occupation [and] 3C requirements will be different for higher ranking officers in command than for privates or staff NCOs or other personnel on foreign ground" is highly suggestive. 46 It appears both Army leadership and the most influential mechanisms for change have accepted the inherent challenges of training and educating enlisted soldiers by uncritically following the cultural awareness pyramid construct in apportioning different levels of training and education to Soldiers of differing rank and responsibility.
This is not to argue that a senior leader engaging a government official or security official shouldn't have a higher level of cultural competence than a private out on patrol. However, if the privates and specialists of the Army are having significantly more cultural exchanges than the senior leader and they're less prepared to interact in a culturally adept manner, there is potential for more frequent and even far-reaching cultural failures. The Army must rethink its rank and position bias and increase the education and training objectives for these Soldiers from merely cultural knowledge to cultural understanding or even competence. All ranks require a combination of education in cultural concepts and training or application in those concepts to truly achieve their greatest potential in cultural capability.
Recent research indicates that leaders might be surprised at soldiers' cultural insight and competence when they've had an opportunity to properly prepare for a 21 mission with significant cultural overtones. The 3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's 2010-11 deployment as advisors supporting the Iraqi Army serves as an example. While 3ACR Soldiers displayed cultural tendencies that created cross-cultural challenges (especially impatience, urgency and directness), they also showed an interesting capacity to intuitively determine the greatest cultural challenges to their advising mission and creatively resolve them. Some common success stories included: understanding and committing to significant investments in time and patience to build trust and relationships; recognition of the importance of a sincere desire to learn and experience new phenomena, subtlety, persistence and cultural accommodation, respect, friendliness and goodwill. Finally, the study concludes that these Soldiers' intercultural capability originated in their transformational leadership practices and firm groundings in socially responsible organizational values. 47 These values and practices provide a strong foundation upon which to build more sophisticated leadership skillsets and cultural capability in both our professional military education for leaders and cultural training for Soldiers across the force. There are indications that after a decade of conflict and exposure to other cultures, a growing number of Soldiers are both aware of the operational importance of cultural competence and motivated to achieve a higher level of capability. This is not to say that the entire force is culturally capable; there remains evidence to the contrary. However, recent studies and observations indicate a growing body of Soldiers and leaders are not merely culturally aware, but predisposed towards cultural competence based on their past experiences. Action. However, the Army is making some organizational changes that warrant some optimism that building cultural capability will not be a casualty in its effort to remission.
The Army's decision to regionally align Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) with geographic combatant commands is an innovative re-missioning of its forces that promises to not only safeguard the gains of the last ten years of growing cultural competence, but also offers the potential to significantly improve its cultural education and training of the force by providing more focus, time and expertise to these efforts.
General Raymond Odierno points out that the Army has learned many lessons over the last 10 years, "but one of the most compelling is that -whether you are working among the citizens of a country, or working with their government or Armed Forces -nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values." 53 There are many advantages that accrue to this approach; most importantly, Soldiers and leaders will have an extended and intensive regional focus that allows the time and resources necessary for a much deeper understanding of a region's cultures.
Resultant culturally relevant training has the potential to serve as a combat multiplier for individual Soldiers, become second nature to aligned units, and lead to benefits in operations, planning and host nation partnering. 54 The manner in which the Army carries out this regional alignment remains to be seen though. The Army must avoid learning the wrong lesson from the last decade and building a force of compartmentalized and regionally focused units at the expense of general culture education and training. This would only perpetuate and institutionalize a past tendency towards inadequate region-specificity. Developing a sophisticated culture-general approach to education is the foundation upon which any regionalspecific orientation must rest. The Army currently has the opportunity to build a force more versed in the deepest nuances of a region's specific culture, while retaining a cross-cultural appreciation and competence derived from culture-general education.
This combination of competencies provides the force a greater capacity for units trained for missions in one region to shift more quickly and effectively to another. Nick Dowling, a former National Security Council director, who runs the culture-training company IDS International contends that "Anthropologically, socially, economically, [Soldiers] will
have to reset what the answers are, but the right questions will already be in their mind." 55 To achieve the full potential of the realignment, the Army must make changes in its antiquated personnel system and how it organizes and partners the force for Special
Operations Forces (SOF)/General Purpose Forces (GPF) integration. First, the Army must alter its personnel system to stabilize soldiers in units with like regional alignments. Language and cultural training for a specific region are costly, timeintensive and particularly perishable skills, so the Army must consider home-steading within units "to retain the regional expertise and personal relationships built by soldiers during their tours in aligned units." 56 Additionally, it must revise both its reenlistment and retention programs to encourage unit stabilization without damaging Soldiers'
careers. Finally, the Army must also assess its current NCO and officer evaluation, counseling, and promotion systems to incorporate cultural competence as a leader attribute and promulgate suitable cultural expertise at increasingly higher ranks in the force. These changes won't be easy or inexpensive for the Army. If cost or environmental conditions preclude any or all of these recommendations, the importance of culture-general education only increases as a way of offsetting the functional gap.
Second, Special Forces Groups and their supporting units must partner with
Brigade Combat Teams and other enabling units in habitual training relationships whereby conventional forces can regularly benefit from SOF language, regional and general-cultural expertise in education and training. There are significant long-term benefits in terms of operational familiarity that result from these habitual relationships.
However, from a cultural perspective, SOF operators would provide an example of cultural competence at all ranks that would have a wide-ranging positive impact on the Army's efforts to push cultural competence down to the lowest level. Their language and regional expertise would also be particularly helpful to a generation of young leaders that understand the importance of cultural competence, but have yet to develop the regional-specific and culture-general expertise to build a comprehensive cultural training program-in effect, SOF would serve as skills and affect mentors.
After ten years of counterinsurgency and the accompanying mission of building foreign security force capacity, both SOF and GPF are increasingly adept and comfortable in employing partnered relationships in training and mission accomplishment. SOF/GPF integration would be an important approach that develops a mindset in units where culture is viewed as a mission enabler rather than a mission inhibitor. Education of leaders and training of Soldiers would benefit from a habitual SOF/GPF relationship whereby these partnered training teams integrate cultural skill building into unit training plans that include practice in cross-cultural communication, rapport building and negotiations.
These organizational and personnel changes compliment previously discussed recommendations for adjustments to the methodology with which the Army educates and trains its soldiers in pursuit of cultural capability. They are just some of the major steps the Army can take to build cross-cultural capability across the force. Appendix A provides additional measures that can and should be taken. Ultimately, education of a cadre of young, veteran Soldiers and leaders in the core principles of culture-general competence, with continuing efforts in regional-specific understanding is priority one.
This must be accomplished in a sequential and holistic fashion at every step of the professional military education process.
Although past experience indicates the need for a balanced approach of culturegeneral and regional-specific competence, the Army may have to make tough choices with limited resources in a fiscally austere environment. If this occurs, it must 27 implement institutional changes promoting culture-general competence across all ranks to establish a strong and transferrable cultural capability across the force in the event that regional-specific measures becomes unsustainable or impractical. This means that the institutional and operational Army must also open their respective cultural apertures to provide the tools, resources and training necessary to push cultural competence down to the individual Soldier. Finally, the Army must promote innovative organizational and training approaches that systematize cultural lessons learned and provide an increasingly culturally astute force across all ranks and in all operational environments.
In closing, rather than more of the same type of cultural awareness and knowledge-based training, the Army must raise its standards, widen its scope, and alter its training objectives and methodology to properly prepare forces to operate in the complex 21 st century strategic environment, an environment which requires forces capable of operating across multiple regions of the globe. Achieving success in this environment requires culturally competent forces. This requirement will only grow in a 21 st century environment marked by U.S. general purpose forces and special operations forces assuming an increasingly supporting and enabling role as partners to foreign security forces. As the Army's cultural primer acknowledges, "America's armed forces cannot 'surge' cultural expertise, nor can they expect complex interpersonal skills and cultural cognition to develop when placed in competition with fundamental military skill sets." 57 Now is the time for the Army to conduct a reassessment of its entire approach to educating and training a culturally capable force for the 21 st century.
As the Army completes its transition and withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is the risk that it will throw itself into the next operational paradigm, become fixated on the projected requirements of Decisive Action and forget the lessons it has learned from ten years of conflict. However, it also has the opportunity to accept the expanded cultural capabilities resident across the force, alter its cultural training methodologies accordingly and creatively organize, educate and train an integrated force. If this occurs, there is great potential for a heretofore unseen culturally capable 21 st century U.S. Army. That force would be comprised of professionals at all levels educated in general cultural tenets and the region-specific characteristics so critical to effective cross-cultural operations. Assuming warfare remains a truly human domain in the 21 st century, the U.S. Army will have made a significant step forward in converting tactical, cultural competence into positive and lasting strategic effects whenever its boots hit the ground across the globe.
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